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Abstract 
Biodiversity is today threatened by many factors of which destruction and reduction of 
habitats are considered most important for terrestrial species. One way to counteract these 
threats is to establish reserves with restrictions on land-use and exploitation. However, very 
few reserves can be considered islands, wildlife species roam over large expanses, often via 
some density dependent dispersal process. As a consequence, habitat destruction, and 
exploitation, taking place outside will influence the species abundance inside the 
conservation area. The paper presents a theoretical model for analysing this type of 
management problem. The model presented allows for both the common symmetric dispersal 
as well as what is called asymmetric dispersal between reserve and outside area. The main 
finding is that habitat destruction outside may not necessarily have negative impact upon the 
species abundance in the reserve. As a consequence, economic forces working in the 
direction of reducing the surrounding habitat have unclear effects on the species abundance 
within the protected area. We also find that harvesting outside the reserve may have quite 
modest effect on the species abundance in the reserve. This underlines the attractiveness of 
reserves from a conservation viewpoint. 
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1. Introduction 
Biodiversity is today threatened by many factors, one of which being over-harvesting, 
another being destruction and reduction of habitats. The former is generally the most 
important for aquatic species (Clark 1990) and is often triggered by unclear property rights 
(Bromley 1991), whereas the latter is considered the most important for terrestrial species 
(Swanson 1994). One way to counteract these threats is to establish conservation zones, often 
in the form of national parks, with various restrictions on harvesting, land-use and other types 
of man-made influences, so that the social benefits of rare and threatened species can at least 
be kept intact inside the reserve1.  
 
The main motivation behind establishing conservation areas for terrestrial species is 
somewhat different to that of marine reserves. The central idea here is, at least from an 
economic point of view, namely to protect spawning stocks or juveniles so they can grow and 
replenish or recolonise other areas and, hence, increase the catch and profitability outside the 
reserves (Conrad 1999, Hannesson 1998, Lauck et al.1998, Pezzey, et al. 2000, Roberts and 
Sargant, 2002, Rodwell et al.2002, Sanchirico and Wilen 2001 and Sumaila 1998). Just as for 
marine reserves, however, terrestrial ecological geography seldom corresponds with 
management geography as the wildlife species frequently roam in and out of the protected 
areas. As a consequence, while land-use and habitat are kept fixed within a protected area, 
harvesting can take place when the wildlife is outside the conservation area. In addition, and 
in contrast to a marine setting, habitat deteriorates and disappears outside. Because of 
dispersion, there will therefore be a management problem in the sense that land-use changes 
and harvesting taking place outside the conservation area influences the stock abundance 
inside the conservation area. This type of management problem, which basically is an 
externality problem, has been frequently mentioned in the literature (see, e.g., Munasinghe 
and McNeely 1994, Swanson 1994, Brown 1997). There are, however, few, if any, analyses 
of this problem in a bio-economic context (but see Skonhoft et al. 2002 and Johannesen 
2003).  
 
The purpose of this paper is to bridge this gap and, from a theoretical point of view, analyse 
how habitat changes as well as harvesting taking place outside the reserve, spill over to the 
conservation area. Hence, the focus is different to that of the marine reserve literature, where 
the effects of reserve implementation upon harvest outside the reserve are the important 
issue. Few, if any, of these studies, have analysed how harvesting outside spills over to the 
reserve. There is also no analysis where the effects of habitat changes outside on the species 
density within the reserve are considered. To facilitate the study, while still capturing the 
main points, we deal only with two areas, or two patches; a reserve and a neighbouring area, 
managed by two different agencies and two sub-populations of wildlife. The conservation 
zone will be of fixed size and land-use is also kept fixed; this is taken as an institutional fact2. 
On the other hand, the land-use can change in the neighbouring area as habitat degrades. We 
                     
1 The history of establishing conservation zones is old, and today more than 5% of the earth’s surface is covered 
with such areas. These areas, however, serve also other purposes than protection of wildlife and plants, and the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) lists seven other kinds of protected areas in addition 
to parks (see e.g., Dixon and Sherman 1991, Brown 1997). 
 
    2In other words, we are not analyzing factors affecting the (social)  optimal size of a conservation area. This is, 
amongst others, studied in Pezzey et al.(2000) in a fishery management context.  
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abstract from any harvesting taking place in the conservation area (but see Wright 1999), thus 
also excluding illegal activities such as poaching. We also abstract from any effort to 
influence the amount of dispersal through fencing, vegetation manipulations, and so forth. 
For these and other reasons, the following model is relatively simple and general, and intends 
to be applicable to conservation areas in developing countries as well as in industrialised 
countries3.  
 
Introduction of reserves causes changes in inter and intra species composition (Pezzey, et al., 
2000). Such stock differences between a reserve and a non-reserve are taken into account in 
the present study. The model introduced is therefore general in an ecological respect in that it 
allows for the more common symmetric dispersal between the reserve and the outside area, as 
well as asymmetric dispersal. Asymmetric dispersal occurs when the relationship between 
stock size and carrying capacity is not directly comparable between the two areas. Hence 
dispersal depends on other factors as well. The asymmetric dispersal may result from more 
advantageous conditions within the reserve, due to habitat preservation (Delong and 
Lamberson, 1999) or larger fecundity due to greater animal size or age (Pezzey, et al., 2000). 
Alternatively, the reserve may supply less advantageous conditions, due to greater predatory 
pressure, competition or cannibalism. 
 
In the next section we formulate the ecological model where the dispersion of wildlife over 
the two areas depends upon the relative species density and stock specific differences in the 
two areas. In section 3 it is analysed how habitat changes and harvesting, taking place outside 
the protected area, influence the species abundance in the protected area. In section 4 we 
introduce economic motives for the owner of the neighbouring area, and it is studied how 
these motives translate into pressure on the reserve. 
 
2. The ecological model 
As noted, we consider two areas and two sub-populations of wildlife. Both areas are assumed 
to be of fixed size, but the land-use can change outside as habitat land can be converted into 
other uses. The protected area may be owned by the state and managed by a park authority 
while we assume that the neighbouring area is managed and owned by a single private agent, 
or by many agents, in sum behaving like a single manager. The owner of the neighbouring 
area has the right to appropriate the benefits of the fugitive biological resources when it is 
inside this area, and hence, has the property rights over the wildlife when it leaves the 
protected area. So while there is no harvesting in the protected area, harvesting takes place 
outside in the neighbouring area if it is a profitable activity.  
 
We let one stock of wildlife represent the whole game population, though one could also 
imagine this one stock being an aggregation of the wildlife species present. The dynamics of 
the two sub-populations are given by 
 
                     
3One significant difference between conservation areas in developing countries and industrialized countries is the 
often conflicting views of the rights to these areas. In developing countries, say, in sub-Saharan Africa, the 
establishment of national parks and game reserves has frequently directly displaced rural communities from the land 
that traditionally was theirs. Moreover, the local people have generally lost their traditional harvesting rights as anti-
poaching laws have turned the old practice of subsistence hunting into a crime. Largely due to these facts, the local 
people generally have a skeptical outlook on reserves, and see wildlife mostly as a nuisance (see, e.g., Kiss 1990 for 
an overview, and Skonhoft and Solstad 1998 for an analysis).  
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(1) dX1/dt =F(X1) - M(X1,X2,K2)  
       =r1X1(1 - X1/K1) - m(ßX1/K1 - X2/K2) 
 
and  
 
(2) dX2/dt =G(X2,K2) + M(X1,X2,K2) - h(e,X2,K2)  
       =r2X2(1 - X2/K2) + m(ßX1/K1 - X2/K2) - φeX2/K2 
 
where X1 is the population size in the protected area at a given point of time and X2 is the 
population size in the neighbouring area at the same time. F(.) and G(..) are the 
accompanying logistic natural growth functions, with ri, i=1,2, defining the maximum 
specific growth rates and Ki the carrying capacities, inside and outside the protected area, 
respectively. The carrying capacity depends on the natural environment for the species, 
assumed to be proportional to the size of the habitat (see e.g., Swallow 1990 and Swanson 
1994). Because the land-use in the protected area is kept fixed, the carrying capacity is also 
fixed here. Outside, the land-use generally changes, and so does the carrying capacity; that is, 
conversion of habitat land into other uses means a reduction of K2. The harvesting h(.) ≥0 
only takes place outside the protected area. It is specified as a Schäfer function and 
determined by the harvest effort e, the catchability coefficient φ and the species density 
X2/K2 as the carrying capacity, as mentioned, is assumed to be proportional to the size of the 
habitat land (Pezzey et al. 2000). 
 
In addition to natural growth and harvesting, the two sub populations are interconnected by 
dispersion as given by the term M(…). Migration and dispersal can be triggered by various 
factors. There may be species with a distinct and more or less fixed yearly migration pattern, 
cf. the famous wildebeest population in the Serengeti-Mara ecosystem in Tanzania (see, e.g., 
Sinclair and Arcese 1995), and there may be density dependent factors present (Skonhoft et 
al. 2002). Here we focus on the latter, and M(…) is assumed to depend on the relative stock 
densities in the two areas, ignoring any other migratory patterns4. m >0 is a parameter 
reflecting the general degree of dispersion; that is topography, size of the areas, type of 
species, and so forth. Hence, a high dispersion parameter m corresponds to species and a 
natural environment with large spatial movement. The parameter ß >0 takes care of the fact 
that the dispersion may be due to, say, different environmental conditions, predator-prey 
relations and competition within the two sub-populations (again, see  Pezzey at al. 2000). For 
equal Xi/Ki, i=1,2, ß >1 results in an outflow from the conservation area and could be 
expected in a situation where there was greater predatory pressure inside the protected area, 
for instance due to there being no hunting in the reserve. Hence, if mobile prey species 
choose, for instance, breeding sites based on their chance for survival and reproductive 
success (Fretwell and Lucas, 1970), there would be an outflow surpassing that of when the 
relative densities do not involve ß. On the other hand, when 0<ß<1, the circumstances outside 
the reserve are detrimental, creating less potential migration out of the reserve. Hence, as 
opposed to the simpler sink-source models found in the literature (cf. the sink-source concept 
of the metapopulation theory, see, e.g., Pulliam 1988), this model incorporates possible intra-
                     
4
 In the following we will use the term density for the relationship between the stocks and their respective 
carrying capacities despite the K’s not actually defining area. This relationship nonetheless has the essence of 
density, in the sense that it describes the degree to which the respective areas are filled to their capacity. Due to 
the possibility of asymmetric dispersal, βX1/K1 and not X1/K1 represents the (effective) density in the protected 
area (see the main text below). 
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stock or inter-species relations that may result in different concentrations in the two areas; 
that is, the dispersal may be asymmetric. Hence, β is independent of the carrying capacity and 
functions as density regulating parameter, depending on the conditions in the relevant areas.  
 
In the bio-economic literature a simpler version of this type of dispersion function is used, 
amongst others, by Huffaker et al.(1992) and Bhat et al.(1996), to analyse the optimal 
management of a beaver population in a two patch model (as here) managed by two different 
agents, where the beaver population is a nuisance (damage on timber stand) and costly to 
hunt in one of the areas. Sanchirico and Wilen (1999) analyse a more general model of an 
open access fishery with n-patches. See also Conrad (1999) and Hannesson (1998) for simple 
density dependent bioeconomic models of marine reserves. Huffaker et al.(1992), Bhat et 
al.(1992) and Sanchirico and Wilen (2001) assume symmetric dispersion. Hence, ß =1 in their 
models. Biological aspects of density dependent dispersion growth models are analysed, 
amongst others, by Hastings (1982), Holt (1985) and Tuck and Possingham(1994). 
Asymmetric dispersal is described in several works (Delong and Lamberson, 1999, Pezzey et 
al., 2000), but to our knowledge not modelled earlier. 
 
In the absence of man there is no harvesting, e =0, and there is no land-use change taking 
place in the neighbouring area, thus K2 is fixed. The isoclines of the system (1) and (2) will 
then be as in Figure 1, depicted for β>1. We assume that there are some restrictions on the 
dispersion so that the marginal dispersion rates are below that of the maximum specific 
growth rates; that is, mß/K1<r1 and m/K2<r2, respectively. The X1-isocline will then intersect 
with the X1-axis at (K1 - mß/r1)>0. It is a strictly convex function of X1 and runs through the 
point (K1, ßK2). Above the isocline the natural growth plus dispersion yield a positive growth 
so that dX1/dt >0, while the population growth is negative below the isocline. The X2-
isocline, on the other hand, is a strictly concave function of X1. It intersects the X2-axis at the 
point (K2 - m/r2)>0 and runs through the point (K1/ß, K2). Below the isocline natural growth 
plus dispersion add up to positive growth, and hence, dX2/dt is positive5.  
 
 Figure 1 about here 
 
For the given restrictions on dispersion when e =0, there will be a unique, positive interior 
equilibrium, X1* and X2*, and as Figure 1 indicates, which also can be confirmed analytically, 
the equilibrium will be stable. If ß=1, both equilibrium stocks will be at their carrying 
capacities, X1*=K1 and X2*=K2 and in equilibrium there is no flow of species between the two 
areas, M*=0. If ß>1, as depicted in Figure 1, the result is X1*<K1 and X2*>K2. The natural 
equilibrium growth in the conservation area is then positive while it is negative in the 
neighbouring area. On the other hand, when 0<ß<1, X1*>K1, X2*<K2, M*<0 will hold. From 
equations (1) and (2) and Figure 1 we also see that combinations of X1 and X2 giving M=0 
can be represented by a straight line from the origin through the points (K1/ß,K2) and (K1, 
βK2). Hence, under this line we have M>0, making the reserve a source, while above this line 
M<0, making the reserve a sink. When ß >1 as in Figure 1, we therefore clearly have that 
                     
5 The X1-isocline of equation (1) may be expressed as X2=K2X1[β/K1 – (r1/m)(1 – X1/K1)] and has generally two 
roots; X1 =0, and X1 =K1 – mβ/r1. If the X2-isocline of (2) is expressed in a similar manner (when e =0), it may 
be recognized that if the above mentioned dispersal restrictions are violated and we have  mß/K1 >r1 and m/K2 
>r2, there will be no intersection of the isoclines for positive X-values.  The model yields then no meaningful 
ecological equilibrium (see also the main text below). The same type of restrictions are assumed tacitly also in 
Sanchirico and Wilen (2001). 
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positive natural growth in the conservation area plus outflow of species M* =m(ßX1*/K1 - 
X2*/K2) >0 adds up to equilibrium. At the same time, the equilibrium stock size in the 
surrounding area is too large to support positive natural growth, meaning that mortality 
dominates recruiting, and is balanced by the inflow.  
 
From Figure 1 it is also clear what happens outside equilibrium. Hence, starting with, say, a 
small X1 and large X2, X1 grows while X2 initially decreases, before it eventually starts 
growing as well. During the transitional phase where both sub-populations grow, the 
dispersal may change sign with inflow into the conservation area being replaced by outflow; 
that is, the conservation area changes from being a sink to being a source. The same shift in 
dispersal may happen when starting with a small X2 as well as a small X1. In what follows, 
however, we will only study what happens when we have ecological equilibrium. 
 
3. The effects of habitat destruction and exploitation 
Having seen the basic mechanisms determining the equilibrium stock sizes in absence of 
man, we proceed to analyse how harvesting and habitat degradation, both activities taking 
place in the neighbouring area, translate into conservation and stock changes in the protected 
area. In a first step, these changes are studied without taking account of the underlying 
economic motives guiding the behaviour of the owner (or owners) of the neighbouring area. 
Hence, at this stage, the consequences for the conservation area are studied for a given 
harvesting effort, and a given habitat degradation. 
 
3.1 Habitat destruction 
We start to analyse the case when e =0, so there are only land-use changes. When more land 
is made up for agricultural production or activities completely unrelated to the biosphere 
(e.g., residences and factories) in the neighbouring area, the habitat shrinks and consequently, 
the carrying capacity K2 decreases. The X2-isocline will then shift down accompanied by a 
rotation in a clockwise manner, while the X1-isocline rotates clockwise around its 
intersection point with the X1-axis. It seems difficult to show generally what happens to the 
equilibrium stock size X2* outside the reserve, but it is possible to show that it decreases, at 
least as long as β is ‘small’6.  On the other hand, the effect of habitat changes upon the stock 
inside the conservation area, X1*, will generally be ambiguous. The reason is that as both K2 
and X2* decline, the change of the ratio X2*/K2 is unclear, and hence, the effect on the 
dispersion between the areas is unclear as well. In the following we study this in detail. 
 
Analytically, the long-run stock effects can be found by taking the total differential of 
equations (1) and (2) when dX1/dt =dX2/dt =0 together with e =0. For the population in the 
conservation area, we obtain 
 
(3) ∂X1*/∂K2 =(1/N)(mr2X2/K22)(1 - X2/K2), 
 
where N ={[r1 - (2r1/K1)X1 - mß/K1][r2 - (2r2/K2)X2 - m/K2] -(mß/K1)(m/K2)}>0 is positive 
because the X1-isocline intersects the X2-isocline from below (cf. Figure 1). We therefore 
                     
6The effect of habitat change upon the stock size outside the reserve is ∂X2*/∂K2 = -(1/N)(X2/K22)[(r1 - 2r1X1/K1 
- mβ/K1)r2X2 - mr1(2X1 /K1 - 1)] where N >0 (see the main text below). After some small rearrangements it 
follows that ∂X2*/∂K2 >0 if (K1 – 2X1)<(mβr2X2)/(r1r2X2 + mr1). Utilising the fact that 1< X1/K1<1/ß if ß<1 and 
1/ß < X1/K1<1 if ß>1, we first find that ∂X2*/∂K2 >0 holds for all ß<1. We next cheque the case of X1/K1= 1/ ß 
when ß>1. It then follows that ∂X2*/∂K2 >0 holds at least for all ß≤2. 
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have ∂X1*/∂K2 >0 only as long the equilibrium stock size in the neighbouring area is below 
its carrying capacity, X2*<K2, or equivalently, if X1*>K1. As demonstrated above, this will be 
the result when 0<ß<1 and there is an inflow of species into the protected area. Thus, when 
the reserve has mitigating characteristics due to, say, advantageous living conditions, a lower 
carrying capacity outside decreases the reserve stock as the inflow will decline when K2 is 
reduced. This also implies that the species density outside the protected area decreases; that 
is, ∂(X2*/K2)/∂K2 >0. However, all the time we will have X1* >K1. On the other hand, 
∂X1*/∂K2 <0 if ß >1 as the outflow declines when K2 shrinks. This time the density outside 
the protected area increases, ∂(X2*/K2)/∂K2 <0. In the case when ß =1, no changes take place 
in the conservation area, ∂X1*/∂K2 =0. Consequently, the species density outside also stays 
unchanged, ∂(X2*/K2)/∂K2 =0. 
 
As just mentioned, we have ∂X1*/∂K2<0 when ß>1 and X1*<K1. It can also be demonstrated 
that ∂X1*/∂m <0 holds in this case. Hence, the combination of a well intact habitat in the 
neighbouring area, K2 is large, and high spatial movement, m is large, may give a small stock 
size in the conservation area. It is straightforward to say something more about this case as 
the species density in the neighbouring area X2*/K2 approaches 1 when K2 becomes large 
(this holds when we have 0<ß<1 as well). Substitution of X2*/K2 =1 into equation (1) (when 
dX1/dt =0) gives 
 
(4) X1* =(K1/2r1){[r1 – (mß/K1)] + [(r1 – (mß/K1))2 + (4r1m/K1)]1/2}.  
 
When ß>1, equation (4) therefore expresses the lowest possible equilibrium stock size in the 
reserve in absence of harvesting. All parameters of the model except r2 and K2 influence the 
outcome, and calculations demonstrate that ∂X1*/∂m <0 (as already indicated), ∂X1*/∂ß <0, 
∂X1*/∂r1 >0 and ∂X1*/∂K1 >0 hold. From equation (4) the condition for X1*<X1msy =K1/2 can 
also be found, which yields m(ß – 2)>K1/2 after some small rearrangements. Hence, a highly 
asymmetric dispersion, ß >2, is therefore a necessary condition for a stock size below X1msy 
when there is no harvesting outside. This implies that only if the reserve for some reason is 
severely detrimental for species survival, will the aggregate stock be below its maximum 
sustainable yield level.  
 
Summing up, we have found that habitat degradation taking place outside the protected area 
represents no problem for the species abundance in the protected area and hence, the degree 
of conservation, according to our model of asymmetric density dependent dispersion. This 
occurs since the equilibrium stock in the protected area all the time either will be over its 
carrying capacity, or increase as a result of habitat destruction. If the reserve is more 
advantageous for the species and 0<β<1, the effect of habitat destruction outside means less 
conservation within the reserve, but all the time we have X1*>K1. On the other hand, if the 
reserve is less advantageous for the species wellbeing with β>1, habitat destruction outside 
means more conservation within the reserve as the dispersal out of the reserve then decreases. 
In the symmetric dispersal models found in the literature with β=1, habitat destruction 
outside the reserve has no effect whatsoever upon the stock in the reserve. The above 
discussion assumes that conservation is preoccupied with preserving stocks against the threat 
of extinction. However, conservation may include the securing of specific stock levels. In 
that case it is not sufficient to solely focus on the stock in the reserve, but rather verify the 
developments for the sum of the two sub-stocks. The details of such an analysis is left out of 
the present exposition, but it follows directly from above that the sum will decrease as a 
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result of habitat destruction when 0<β<1 while the outcome is ambiguous when β>1 and 
species flow out of the reserve making M* >0. 
 
3.2 Harvesting 
When e>0 and harvesting takes place with no changes in the land-use and K2 is fixed, the X2-
isocline in Figure 1 shifts down compared to the non-harvesting case. The X1-isocline is 
unaffected. As a result, the stocks in both areas decrease. This happens when either species 
flow into or out of the conservation area. Harvesting outside the protected area translates 
therefore unambiguously into a lower equilibrium stock size in the protected area. 
Analytically the effect can again be found by taking the total differential of equations (1) and 
(2) when dX1/dt =dX2/dt =0. The result is 
 
(5) ∂X1*/∂e =-(1/R)mqX2/K22 <0 
 
where the determinant R is slightly different from the non-harvesting case, R={[r1 - 
(2r1/K1)X1 - mß/K1][r2 - (2r2/K2)X2 - m/K2 - qe/K2] -(mß/K1)(m/K2)}. R>0 because the X1-
isocline intersects with the X2-isocline from below, also when e>0.  
 
The effect on the dispersion between the two areas may also be found, and this reads  
 
(6) ∂M*/∂e =(1/R)(qmr1X2/K1K22)(2X1 - K1).  
 
In absence of harvesting and 0<β<1, we found X1*>K1 together with a flow of species into 
the conservation area, M*<0. Introduction of harvesting effort then clearly yields ∂M*/∂e>0, 
and, hence, decreased inflow. As we also have F(X1*) =M* <0, the natural growth F(X1*) 
becomes less negative as well, and X1* approaches K1. For even more effort, X1* becomes 
eventually lower than that of K1. The natural growth is thus positive, and we have F(X1*) 
=M* >0 and species flow out of the reserve. During the course of increased harvesting effort, 
the reserve may therefore change from being a sink to being a source7. Moreover, when being 
positive, M* increases all the time as long as we have X1* <K1/2 =X1msy. If eventually 
reaching a stock size below that of X1msy when e becomes large, we therefore also have that 
there must exist a maximum degree of dispersion out of the reserve, taking place at X1* 
=X1msy.  See Figure 2, panel a. This may happen if the natural environment for dispersion is 
high, and hence, m is large, cf. equation (7) below8.  
 
 Figure 2 about here 
 
If, on the contrary, we had F(X1*) = M* >0 and X1*<K1 when ß>1 together with e=0, species 
will always flow out of the conservation area when harvesting effort is introduced. Moreover, 
if initially X1* >K1/2, condition (6) again tells us that M* increases when e shifts up. If 
eventually reaching a stock size below that of K1/2=X1msy when e becomes large, we 
therefore also now find that there must exist a maximum degree of dispersion out of the 
reserve. See Figure 2, panel b. 
                     
7
This outcome may also easily be realised when redrawing Figure 1 for 0<β<1 and introducing harvesting effort 
e shifting the X2-isocline downwards.   
8 This issue is clearly of interest also in the case of marine reserves, since we observe a positive effort level that 
maximises migration out of the reserve. 
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As already seen, the X2-isocline shifts down compared to the non-harvesting case. However, 
it can be shown that it always yields a positive X2 when X1 >0, irrespective of the amount of 
harvesting effort introduced9. Consequently, X2*, as well as X1*, will be positive for all finite 
values of e. When e approaches infinity, the X2-isocline approaches the X1-axis, and X2* 
approaches zero. In sharp contrast to the standard one patch model, the effort must therefore 
approach infinity to totally deplete the stock. This is due to the protective effect of the closed 
area. Hence, even if the stock outside the reserve is depleted, or close to being depleted, the 
stock in the protected area will be kept intact. From equation (1) (when dX1/dt =0) it namely 
follows that X1* approaches 
 
(7) X1* =(K1 - mß/r1) >0  
 
when X2 approaches zero, and hence, e approaches infinity. This condition yields a positive 
X1* due to the given restrictions on dispersion (cf. section 2). Consequently, even for very 
high harvesting pressure the stock in the protected area may still be positive. This underlines 
the attractiveness of reserves from a conservation viewpoint. As seen, the critical low level of 
conservation is positively related to the size of the carrying capacity K1. A high intrinsic 
growth rate r1 works in the same direction while a higher dispersion parameter m together 
with a higher value of ß has opposite effects. Again the condition for X1*<X1msy=K1/2 may be 
found, which now reads mβ/r1 >K1/2. This condition is therefore met in all cases in Figure 2. 
 
 
3.3 The simultaneous effect of harvesting and habitat destruction 
So far we have studied the effects of changes in harvesting effort and carrying capacity 
separately. It is however clear that both effort and carrying capacity may change 
simultaneously in habitats connected to natural reserves, and the effects upon the reserve 
stock size may be expected to vary depending on the migrational characteristics. This is 
illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
 Figure 3 about here  
 
We see from the figure (panel b) that for ß >1 there is a trade-off between increased 
harvesting effort and habitat degrading outside the reserve. That is, a given stock size or level 
of conservation in the reserve may be maintained with increased effort and reduced carrying 
capacity outside. Furthermore, for an increased stock size in the reserve, a given carrying 
capacity outside the reserve implies lower effort. When 0 <ß <1 (panel a) there is no such 
trade-off, as reduced carrying capacity outside means less protection in the conservation area. 
In this case an increased stock size in the reserve, for a given effort level, is accompanied by 
a higher carrying capacity. 
 
 
4. On the optimal exploitation of the neighbouring area 
The consequences for the species density in the conservation area have been analysed for 
given changes in harvesting and habitat destruction. In what follows, however, we will 
                     
9 A simple way to realise this is to rewrite the X2-isocline as r2X2(1 – X2/K2)  =(m/K2 + qe/K2) X2 - (mβ/K1)X1 , 
and study the intersection between the LHS and RHS of this equation for various values of X1 and e. 
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introduce economic motives for a single owner of the neighbouring area and analyse how 
these motives influence harvesting and land-use, and hence, translate into species density in 
the protected area. The justification for studying a single owner situation is either that one 
owner manages the land outside the reserve, or that many owners co-operatively manage 
hunting and land-use. For land-based resources such a management, as a stylized fact 
scheme, fits probably better to reality than so-called open access exploitation (but see 
Swanson 1994). All the time it will, for simplicity, be assumed that profit maximisation  in 
ecological equilibrium ('sustainable rent') is steering the land-use and harvesting policy. 
Compared to scenarios of present-value maximisation, what happens outside the various 
steady-states is therefore neglected, and the rate of return on alternative assets (the rate of 
discount) is also disregarded (see, e.g., Munro and Scott 1985).  
 
The current net benefit is given by 
 
(8) π = Q(A) + J(X2) + B(X2,K2)e, 
 
where the first term Q(A) gives the net benefit of land-use from alternative activities, say, 
agricultural production with A as the amount of land allocated to this activity. The second 
term J(X2) yields the non-consumption benefits of the wild species, and can represent various 
types of values; direct use-value in the form of eco-tourism benefit, or indirect value as it can 
capture ecosystem functions, etc. (see, e.g., Freeman (1993) for an overview). The third term 
B(X2,K2)e gives the harvesting benefit as the owner of the neighbouring area appropriates the 
benefits of the wildlife when it is outside the protected area, assumed to be linear in effort use 
under the present assumption of a Schäfer harvesting function10. 
 
If the total land is fixed as T, and aK2 is the size of habitat land and hence, 1/a is the fixed 
coefficient transforming habitat land into potential biological productivity (cf. section 2), the 
land-use constraint reads A ≤(T – aK2). We assume that Q(0) =0 and Q' >0 while the 
marginal benefit may be either decreasing or constant, Q'' ≤0. Q'' =0, implies that land from 
an alternative point of view is homogeneous, and is in accordance with the assumption of 
homogeneous habitat land reflected by the fixed coefficient a. The non-consumptive benefit 
function J(X2) is assumed to have the properties J(0) =0, J' >0 and J'' ≤0. Under the Schäfer 
harvesting function assumption, the harvesting profit reads B(X2,K2)e =(pφX2/K2 – c)e. p is 
the harvest price, assumed to be fixed and unaffected by the harvesting and the stock density, 
and c is the unit effort cost, also assumed to be fixed. A smaller size of habitat, for a given 
stock size, therefore means a higher unit profit, as it becomes easier to catch the species. 
 
The optimal equilibrium land-use and harvesting policy for the owner of the neighbouring 
area is found by maximising the net-benefit function (8), subject to the ecological constraints 
(1) dX1/dt =0 and (2) dX2/dt =0. On reduced form, these constraints may be represented as X1 
=V(K2,e) and X2 =W(K2,e), respectively. The sign of ∂V/∂K2 =VK  is negative or positive 
depending on whether species flow out of or in to the conservation area (cf. section 3.1), 
while the harvesting effect all the time is negative, Ve <0. Moreover, We <0 and we assume 
that WK >0 always hold (cf. also footnote 6).  
 
                     
10 No investment costs for converting wilderness land into cultivated land are included. The land-use is also 
tacitly assumed to be reversible. 
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The Lagrangian of this problem is L =Q(T – aK2) + J(X2) + B(X2,K2)e + λ[ W(K2,e) – X2], 
where λ >0 is the shadow price of the wildlife sub-population X2. Notice that the constraint 
X1 =V(K2,e) is not directly included in the optimisation problem as X1 follows recursively 
when the other variables are found. The economic reason is the presence of a unidirectional 
externality working from the outside area to the reserve.  
 
The first order conditions for a maximum are 
 
(9) ∂L/∂K2 = –Q’a + eBK + λWK  =0,   
 
(10) ∂L/∂e = B + λWe ≤ 0 
 
and  
 
(11) ∂L/∂X2 =J’ + eBX - λ =0 
 
when there always is land-use in the domain (0,T), with or without harvesting. Equation (9) is 
the equilibrium land-use condition with Q’a as the marginal benefit of agricultural land while 
(eBK + λWK) gives the marginal benefit of the habitat. Condition (11), on the other hand, 
represents the (economic) equilibrium condition of keeping species where (J’ + eBX) 
represents the marginal benefit while λ represents the marginal opportunity cost of doing so. 
 
4.1 Zero harvest 
When we in a first stage assume that harvesting does not take place because there is no 
market, or a very thin market, for meat and/or trophies, and the harvesting price is non-
existent or low, the above first order conditions reduce to  
 
(9’)  –Q’a + λWK  =0 
 
(11’)  J’ - λ =0. 
 
These two conditions together with the reduced form ecological equilibrium condition X2 
=W(K2,0) then determine the shadow price λ*, the equilibrium stock size X2* and the carrying 
capacity K2* and hence, the land-use. In a next step, X1* is found through X1* =V(K2*,0). It 
can easily be confirmed that higher marginal benefit of agricultural production (or other 
economic activities), implies more land allocated to agriculture and reduced biological 
productivity, i.e., K2* decreases when Q’ shifts up. Hence, also X2* decreases. A positive shift 
in the marginal non-consumptive value of the species J’ gives the opposite results. These 
results are as expected. 
 
Land-use conversion triggered by improved profitability in agricultural production therefore 
works in the direction of more wildlife and more conservation in the protected area if it 
serves as a source and species flow out, M*>0. This result is the opposite of Schulz and 
Skonhoft (1996) who in a somewhat different setting, find that improved profitability in 
agriculture always represents a threat to species conservation. On the other hand, if the 
protected area serves as a sink, M*<0, a higher opportunity cost of the surrounding habitat 
land reduces the species abundance here as well as in the conservation area as the inflow 
declines.  
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4.2 Positive harvesting 
When harvesting is a profitable activity and e >0, the first order condition (10) will also hold 
as an equation. Hence, equations (9) – (11) together with X2 =W(K2,e) then determine X2*, 
K2*, e* and the shadow price in this case. In a next step, as above, the stock size in the 
protected area follows through X1* =V(K2*,e*). The comparative static results are now more 
complex than in the non-harvesting case, and numerical experiments demonstrate that the off-
take price has unclear effects on the species abundance and land-use in the neighbouring 
area. The effect on the degree of conservation is also unclear. An increased harvest price may 
also increase the effort use while more land is allocated to habitat, K2* rises, at the same time. 
Table 1 demonstrates the effects where the harvest price – marginal agricultural benefit ratio 
shifts. For these shifts the species abundance in the conservation zone (last column) decreases 
all the time, also when β >1, meaning that the ‘harvesting effect’ outbalances the ‘habitat 
effect’ (cf. also Figure 3, panel b). 
 
Table 1 about here  
 
The reason for these ambiguous results is that an increased p for a given land-use, motivates 
for more harvesting and stock depletion according to the standard harvesting model (Clark 
1990). On the other hand, an increased p makes habitat investments more attractive as the 
marginal benefit ratio of the two competing activities harvesting and agricultural production 
p/Q’ increases. Hence, an increased p has a two-sided effect on land-use and species 
abundance, thus when there is dispersion, more habitat and species can go hand in hand with 
more harvesting. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
One way to counteract destruction and reduction of habitats is to establish conservation zones 
with restrictions on harvesting and land-use. However, very few reserves can be considered 
islands because wildlife species move around. As a consequence, habitat destruction and 
exploitation, taking place outside influences the species abundance inside the conservation 
area as well. The paper presents a theoretical model for analysing this type of management 
problem where two sub-populations, in the reserve and in a neighbouring area, are linked 
together through a density dependent dispersal process. Reserves cause change in inter and 
intra species composition, and such stock differences between a reserve and a surrounding 
non-reserve are taken into account in the present analysis as it is opened up for what is said to 
be an asymmetric dispersal. All the time it is studied what happens in ecological equilibrium. 
 
The main finding is that habitat destruction outside does not necessarily yield a negative 
impact upon the long-term species abundance in the reserve. It is shown that the critical 
factor for what happens is whether the wildlife flows from the reserve to the outside area or 
the opposite; that is, whether the conservation zone serves as a source or sink. When the 
reserve is a source, habitat reduction outside gives a higher long-term population size inside 
the protected area. The reason being, that a smaller surrounding habitat increases the species 
density outside and hence reduces the dispersion out of the reserve. Consequently, economic 
forces working in the direction of reducing the surrounding habitat through increased 
profitability in, say, agriculture, give ceteris paribus a higher species abundance in the 
conservation zone. In real life there are many examples that the species density has increased 
within a protected area while the outer area has been less useless for the same species. One 
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example is reported by Vistnes et al. (2004) who find that building of roads and power lines 
in south-central Norway during the last years has increased the density of wild reindeer in its 
core area (the reserve) while the density has decreased in the areas affected by the 
encroachment.   
 
The effect of harvesting outside the reserve always yields a smaller stock within the reserve. 
When conditions are more attractive to the species outside the reserve than inside, increased 
effort increases the flow out of the reserve. In the opposite case, i.e. when conditions are 
more attractive within the reserve, the reserve will at low effort levels function as a sink. As 
effort increases, migration into the reserve will decrease, until finally the reserve will become 
a source. However, moderate harvesting pressure, changing the reserve from sink to source, 
may not represent a problem from a conservation point of view, as long as the conservation 
effect within the reserve still is strong. 
 
Generally we have shown that, if taking place, harvesting and harvesting profitability outside 
the reserve have unclear effects on the species abundance in the reserve. If the surrounding 
area is managed by a single owner maximising profit in ecological equilibrium , we find that 
this unclear effect is a result of to the fact that the direct harvesting effect due to the 
traditional Clark-model may be counterbalanced by investment in habitat being profitable in 
the surrounding area. And when there are unclear stock as well as land-use effects in the 
surrounding area, the conservation effect in the reserve may also be unclear. 
  
ooo00ooo 
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Figure 1. The X1-isocline and X2-isocline in absence of harvesting, β >1. 
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Figure 2. The size of the protected stock X1* and dispersal M* depending on harvesting 
effort. Panel a) 0<β<1, panel b) β >1, panel c) β=1. 
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Figure 3. The size of the protected stock X1* under simultaneous changes in carrying 
capacity and harvesting, X1*2>X1*1. Panel a) 0<β<1, panel b) β >1, panel c) β=1. 
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Table 1. Stock sizes X1* and X2*, habitat land K2* and harvesting effort e* depending on 
relative harvesting benefit p/Q’ =p/q and β.  
  β=0.5    β=1.0    β=2.0   
p/q 2 4 6 8 2 4 6 8 2 4 6 8 
e* 0 0 30 50 0 40 70 110 20 60 80 120 
*
2K  40 40 40 60 70 70 120 330 60 60 100 310 
*
2X  21 21 17 23 70 52 75 191 86 61 88 230 
*
1X  1010 1010 967 949 1000 907 863 843 844 713 663 610 
Table note: Net benefit function (8) when the marginal benefit of agricultural production is 
fixed, Q(A) =qA and the non-consumption benefit function is specified as J(X2) =jX20.5. 
Profit per unit value agricultural land, π/q =(T – aK2) + (j/q)X20.5 + [(p/q)(φX2/K2) – (c/q)]e. 
Parameter values; K1 =1000, r1 =r2 =0.30, T =1000, a =0.5. Relative prices; j/q =1, c/q =2. 
 
 
 
 
